The Problems of Export Trade: How to Solve?

N export trade, disputes between trading parties namely seller (exporter) and buyer (importer) may crop up to various causes, which in essence, are as under:

(A) Misunderstanding concerning meaning or interpretation of terms as stipulated in

(B) Execution of export sale in violation of contract

export contract.

(C) Dishonour of export bill by non-acceptance or nonpayment due to discrepancy in export documents.

(D) Difficulties in repatriation of export proceeds due to change in trade policy or revenue policy of the government in the importer's country.

The above causes of dispute are enumerated below:-

(A) Misunderstanding concerning meaning or interpretation of terms as stipulated in contract:

a) A contract executed between a buyer and a seller is the basis for every foreign trade transaction. Now how a foreign trade contract is executed? Occasionally it is executed in the form of a written document signed by both the parties. But very frequently an exporter communicates his offer to the importer by telex/cable or by airmail and an importer accepts the offer, when it becomes a contract and vice-versa. Sometimes even in export fair two trading parties may reach a verbal agreement to buy/sell a product and when that verbal agreement is subsequently confirmed in writing, that be-

comes a contract. b) The principal of offer and acceptance though seem simple, in practice it may be more complex. Suppose, the exporter sends out his quotation on a standard form incorporating his general conditions such as (i) description and quality of goods (ii) quantity of goods (iii) rate and delivery terms (iv) date of shipment and (v) other required terms. (c) The importer possibly accepts the offer, but communicates acceptance on his own standard form, where conditions incorpo-

rated were not identical

Thailand to liberalize its trade

and investment regimes on a

developments had helped

Thailand transform its econ-

omy from one founded largely

on basic agriculture to a more

diversified structure with a

major share of domestic output

coming from manufacturing.

The foreign investment at-

tracted to Thailand had further

strengthened Thailand's com-

petitiveness and boosted eco-

Thailand's liberalization and

expansion of trade had been a

positive contribution to the

world trading system. At the

same time the liberal interna-

tional trading system had been

highly beneficial to Thailand's

promotion of exports. Even so,

many members emphasized

the need for Thatland's eco-

nomic policy efforts to be sup-

ported by international trade

liberalization, including in

agriculture and textiles. The

rapid growth in Thailand's in-

ternational trade had in-

creased its dependence on ex-

ternal markets and strength-

ened the emphasis given by

Thatland, since its accession to

the GATT in 1982, on a

strong, open and equitable

multilateral trading system.

Concerns

Thailand for the direction of

its policy reforms, Council

members indicated several ar-

eas where general or particular

measures created uncertainty

Thailand's trade policy laws

and practices were marked

by considerable degree of

discretion. Particular men-

or lacked transparency:

commending

It was pointed out that

nomic growth.

The impetus provided by

most-favoured nation basis.

on all the points mentioned in the offer. In the eye of law, due to this divergence in the acceptance from the offer, it has become a counter offer. which the other party may accept or reject. If the exporter ignoring the difference in the terms between offer and acceptance effects shipment then he has probably implicitly agreed to the importer's terms.

(d) It is imperative on the part of an exporter to take into consideration the following before sending an offer or accepting the

(i) Whether he has sufficient stock to ship the contractual goods in time. (ii) If he has to buy the goods from market or procure raw materials for production and shipment, then he must assess whether it will be possible to buy/manufactured goods at a cost which is less than the contractual price, which on shipment will enable him to retain a profit margin.

(iii) Inspite of the fact that answers to above proposttions are negative and still the exporter has sent an offer or accepted the same, then a dispute is probably inevitable.

(B) Execution of export sale in violation of contract terms:

(a) Exporter may encounter the following difficulties while executing the export order :-(i) He has no ready stock

and has to procure the goods from the market, but finds that the market price has suddenly sprung up. This will result in a loss to him, if he decides to execute the order. (ii) In the off-season the

contractual goods are not available and by the time goods will arrive at the market, the shipment period mentioned in the contract will already be expired.

(iii) Production capacity of the factory is inadequate to complete production of the entire consignment within the shipment period mentioned in the contract/partial shipment may be effected, but contract prohibits partial

(iv) Vessel for the destination porf is not available within the shipment period mentioned in the contract, though goods have already been sent to port for shipment.

(b) In the above unfavourable situation, the exporter may decide as under:-

(i) To ship inferior quality goods in order to make good the losses due to rise in the price of commodity. (ii) To cancel the contract unilaterally without shipment of goods.

(iii) To effect partial shipment, since full quantity could not be produced in time, though the same is prohibited as per contract.

(iv) Goods shipped for delivery at another port in the importing country for which vessel is available, though the some is not in conformity with terms of contract.

(c) Any one of the above actions of the exporter will give rise to a trade dispute provided he takes unilateral action without consent or agreement of the buyer. In order to avoid a dispute over the matter, the best course for the seller is to convince the buyer before shipment regarding necessary changes in the terms and conditions of contract. The seller should agree to pay compensation, where necessary, as per trade usage and practices. He should effect shipment only on receipt of written amendments of the contract letter of credit.

(C) Dishonor of export bill by non-acceptance or nonpayment due to discrepancies in export docu-

ments:-Occasionally, it becomes difficult to obtain payment of export bill due to even minor discrepancies in documents, although goods were shipped strictly as per quality and specification mentioned in the contract /letter of credit. Sometimes when the price of the imported commodity fall in the importer country, the importer in order to avoid a loss refuses the documents on pointing out unby Gazanfar Ali

tenable discrepancies in document. Occasionally, it also happens that buyer, failing to recover exports claims in respect of previous consignments draws on the same buyer, endeavours to find out imaginary/filmsy discrepancies, although the present documents are drawn strictly as per terms of contract/letter of credit in order to exert pressure

on the seller (exporter) to make a compromise at the terms dictated by the buyer (importer). For example, in our trade with Italy for export of hides and skins, a dispute of this nature is a common phenomenon. Payment of export bill payable on demand or ever duly accepted time bill is held up by the concerned letter of credit issuing bank at the instance of Italian court and this type of legal proceedings in Italy is commonly called "Conservative Arrest" in such a case the payment is delayed till the Italian court delivers judgement. And it is hardly possible to get a favourable judgement until the Bangladeshi exporter has made prior compromise with the Italian buyer at the buyer's dictated

(D) Difficulties in Repatriation of export proceeds due to change in trade policy or revenue policy of the government in the importer's country:

terms.

Difficulties may arise in repatriation of export proceeds due to change in trade policy or revenue policy of the government in the importer's country. For example, the US government imposed quota restriction on four popular categories

(334,335,340,341) of their textile products on March 1, 1985. As a result, payment of goods of those categories exported beyond the quota restriction could not be recov-

Dishonoured Bill:

Steps for protect on of negotiating bank and exporter's Interest:

(a) Reasons for dishonour of export bill by non-payment or non acceptance by the drawee (buyer) is communicated to the correspondent bank in the importer's country, who presented the documents. The correspondent bank. in turn, transmit the informations to the negotiating /collecting bank in the exporter's country by telex/cable message. On receipt of the information. negotiating /collecting bank passes over the same to the exporter seeking his instruction in the matter.

(b) The exporter now endeavours to comprehend the reasons of dishonour ie nature of discrepancies as communicated to him. The discrepancies in documents are normally as under:

(f) Late shipment. (ii) Letter of credit expired.

(tii) L/C amount exceeded. Pre-shipment/transhipment effeeted not covered by the L/C terms.

(v) Description or rate of goods in invoice differ from that in the L/C con-

(vi) Port of loading or destination is different from that stipulated in L/C contract.

(vii) Shipment on deck or by chartered vessel though not authorised in L/C. (viii) Bill of lading does not evidence whether freight is prepaid or not. (ix) Unclean bill of lading or bill of lading does not bear "on Board" notation duly authenticated. (x) Weights differ between

documents. (xi) Dishonour may be due to other discrepancies in documents.

(b) It all depends upon the nature of discrepancies whether compromise settlement is possible or not. If the discrepancies are due to apparent mistake in preparation of documents, which is not possible to be rectified at this stage and if these mistakes in documents do not materially effect the interest of the buyer, than the

buyer could possibly be convinced by the seller (exporter) when the points of discrepancies are amply-clarified over phone/telex. But where discrepancies may possibly jeopardise the interest of the buyer resulting in moretary losses, reconciliation between buyer and seller could be achieved only on agreeing to make good the possible losses of the buyer. When the buyer's demand is reasonable and justified, the best course for the seller is to agree to his terms and obtain consent for payment/acceptance of the dishnonoured bill. The seller will then advise his banker to instruct correspondent bank in the importer's country to represent the bill to the drawee (buyer) and abstain payment/ acceptance as the case may be. Negotiating /Collecting bank will accordingly instruct the correspondent bank to represent the bill to the drawee and obtain payment/acceptance. Thus

solved amicably. (c) In case where inspite of best efforts, settlement over the dispute could not be achieved, the seller may instruct negotiating /collecting bank as under: (f) To protest the export bill in respect of dishonour by non-payment /non-

the dispute may be re-

acceptance. (ii) To protect the goods at the port of destination. The negotiating /collecting bank on receipt of exporter's instruction will advise correspond bank by telex/cable accordingly. (d) Some foreign banks express their inability to undertake the responsibility of protecting the goods at the landing port. In that case, the negotiating bank may request the

of a set of non-negotiable documents. (e) Where all efforts for mutual settlement of dispute fail, the exporter may approach following organisations for their assistance

commercial wing of our

embassy in the importer's

country to arrange for pro-

tection of relative goods at

the landing port on supply

in a settlement; - Commercial wing of Bangladesh embassy in the importer's country. - Export promotion

 Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

(i) Commercial wing of Bangladesh embassy in the importer's country. The exporter may approach commercial wing of Bangladesh embassy in the importer's country to assist in the matter of dispute with the buyer.

(ii) Export Promotion

Bureau. Exporter may approach the Export Promotion Bureau on supply of papers/ documents as mentioned in the proceeding para for their assistance in the dispute for settlement. They generally take up the dispute with the commercial wing to foreign embassies of importer's country located in Bangladesh.

(iii) Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Bangladesh has formed a joint committee with their counterparts in several countries for settlement of trade disputes. The federation is in a position to play an important role in this regard. Exporter may submit copies of relevant papers/documents relating to their dispute with buyer for a settlement.

Settlement of dispute raised by importer

When a buyer lodges claims to the seller in respect of any of the above ground and if the claim is reasonable and justified then he should accept the claim for better mutual relationship. In addition, he should be careful not to repeat similar incidence in order to preserve his own image and protect interest of the country's export trade in general.

International Arbitration:

In case no settlement could be reached either by mutual understanding or through the assistance of organisations mentioned earlier, then the last resort of the exporter is international arbitration. International Chamber of Commerce undertakes such type of arbitration.

Steps to be followed by exporters where settlement failed:

(a) In case of non-settlement of dispute with

buyer inspite of all possi-

ble efforts made, the only course left is to sale the goods to a second buyer. Exporter has to find out a new buyer and enter into a contract with him. The commercial wing to Bangladesh embassy in the importer's country may be requested to find out a new buyer.

(b) Negotiating/collecting bank informs Exchange Control Department of Bangladesh Bank regarding dishonour of the bill by non-payment or non-acceptance. The exporter has to obtain approval of the sale to the second buyer on submission of the relative contract through negotiating /collectingbank. On receipt of approval of the new sale Bangladesh Bank and instruction of exnegotiatporter, ing/collecting bank instructs correspondent bank to deliver the goods to the second buyer on collection of contractual amount from him.

In export the best course is to avoid the dispute. In order to achieve this exporter should abide by the terms and conditions as mentioned in contract letter of credit and to supply goods in time as per specification and quality as mentioned in the contract. Risks of dispute may be reduced only through improved mutual relationship with the buyer. This improved relationship in the case of trading transactions must depend on integrity, straight forward dealing and rightcousness of the exporter.

GATT Council Reviews Trade

Medical welcomed the Regimes of Thailand taken place in Thailand's economy in the direction of more open policies and commended Thailand for its smooth transition from import substitution to greater integration into the international economy. Since the late 1970s, Thailand has pursueed a range of positive policies, ineluding fiscal and monetary discipline and a more flexible exchange rate regime. These policies, in combination with an improved external situation,

had contributed to impressive growth and diversification in Thailand's economic structure, foreign trade and investment. The Council appreciated the preparing its report; important steps taken by

some cases;

licensing regime, government procurement (including the use of the "national

Concern was expressed about the use of multiple policies such as tariffs, import licensing and local content schemes to protect

to the Secretariat in

Tariffs remained high and disparate, with substantial

interest" criterion), and customs valuation; levy-type surcharges was

particular sectors. Lack of transparency in some policy areas was noted. In this context, some members observed that Thailand had been unable to provide certain information

Infant industry protection had been in place for substantial periods of time in

tion was made of the import to non-automatic, discretionary licensing. The number of items under licensing now as higher than in 1982: The replacement of nontariff measures by variable

> distortions; The scope and variety of incentives for exports could lead to subsidization, and hence risk the application of countervailing measures

seen as continuing existing

by other parties; The need to improve intellectual property protection

was emphasized: Thailand had not signed any MTN Code. Members particularly encouraged Thailand to accede to the Customs Valuation and Import Licensing Agreements. In this regard, it was pointed out that Thailand need not



Brisk business with Thai Commodities

escalation and tariff peaks for many product categories. The weighted average level of applied tariffs was higher than in 1982. Statutory tariffs were substantially higher than applied rates. Thailand had bound only about 3 per cent of its tariff lines. A significant share of tariff lines, especially for agriculture, bore alternate tariffs;

The use of surcharges on imports, and provisions of tax and duty exemptions on goods which were in short supply in the domestic market, introduced uncertainty in the trade policy regime;

There was apparent dis-crimination between imports and domestic products under the business tax

Most items covered by import licensing were subject

wait till the end of the Uruguay Round to consider signing the Customs Valuation Code because the nature of the new Code had become reasonably clear.

Members welcomed Thatland's commitment to replace the business tax by a VAT system and expressed the hope that it would be applied in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner. The question was asked whether Thailand would seek an extension of its GATT waiver for the business tax.

The generally non-discriminatory nature of Thatland's tariff regime was recognized. Most members welcomed Thailand's offer to bind about 50 per cent of its tariff lines in the Uruguay Round. Some others felt that this offer was not fully satisfactory. Hope was expressed that future liberalization would be balanced and in-

Council members hope that Thailand's plans to rationalize and further reduce tariffs. lower other import and export restrictions, and to replace the business tax with a more transparent VAT system would be implemented in the near future; that the government would continue its policy of reduced reliance on import

surcharges; and that the tarif-

fication of non-tariff measures

would be extended. Members took note of the priority given by Thailand to domestic processing and decentralization of economic activity. One member, welcoming Thailand's liberalization, said that reductions in barriers to imports of raw materials, intermediates and capital goods were appropriate for a developing country where tariffs provided both protection for infant industries and substantial government revenues, and import licensing was to some extent unavoidable.

Policies concerning liberalization of foreign investment conditions were welcomed. Some members looked forward to greater predictability and further liberalization in this area.

Important trade policy objectives of Thailand focused on promotion of light industries, selected heavy industries and export-oriented industries. The process of mak-

ing specific decisions in various policy areas; plans for developing alternative revenue sources to tariffs; customs valuation procedures; the trade regime for agricultural products; the nature of, and prospects for liberalization of, local content schemes; details of rationalization of sectoral assistance policies, in particular through the import licensing regime; criteria used for replacing non-tariff measures with surcharges; procedures used in government procurement; the problems arising in Thailand's possible accession to the MTN Codes; how far environmental concerns had been incorporated in policy; Thailand's views on increasing economic cooperation with

ASEAN; plans to widen the

sources of foreign direct in-

vestment in Thailand; and

steps taken to liberalize trade-

protection could be reduced.

USTRALIA has once again put out the wela come sign to entice more foreign banks to set up business.

But given the experience of foreign banks already operating in Australia, the response to the invitation is sure to be a lot less than enthusiastic.

Most of them have lost money. They have had to lower their expectations, growth projections and profit forecasts to reflect the tougher than anticipated competitive environment.

All foreign banks in Australia are reassessing their positions. All but a few have no plans for expansion. Many continue to be in business only because of the deep pockets of their parent banks.

There are plenty of rumours in financial circles that some foreign banks are seriously considering retreating from Australia before their losses become too horrendous. Some observers predict that half of them will have closed within five years. And that only a couple, possible three, will be operating in Australia by the end of the decade.

The Australian government is disappointed with the performance of foreign banks already here. It wants more of them to provide greater com-

petition. Early in 1985 the government approved applications from 16 foreign banks (out of 42) for licences to set up full banking services. Five of the banks were American. Three were British banks and three Japanese. The other five were from Singapore, Canada, West Germany, Hong Kong and New Zealand.

The move was part of the Labour Party government's deregulation programme. It also reflected a need to inject more competition into the local banking scene.

But despite the large number of newcomers, the extra competition proved to be minimal, and it occurred mainly in the corporate sector. Most Australians experienced little, if any, improvement in banking. They were given no incentive to desert the long-established domestic banks.

related investment measures. The government had hoped One participant asked whether the foreign banks would secure any research bodies had made at least 20 per cent of the Ausstudies showing how industrial tralian market within five years. But, although there have

for Foreign Banks by Vincent W Stove

Down Under Market Too Competitive

been 16 of them, and only four major local banks, the newcomers cornered only roughly 10 per cent of the business.

About half of them have consistently posted losses. Except for one notable exception, the others have made only negligible profits. Recent estimates suggest that total losses of the foreign-based operators are just about in sight of US\$

Despite the government's wish that foreign banks should

ucts and staff training. The newcomers found it particularly difficult to compete with solidly entrenched networks of local banks across the sparsely populated Australian continent. Since entering the country, foreign banks have opened less than 100 branches to compete with about 6,500 branches and

local banks. The performance of foreign banks has been far from im-

8,000 agencies operated by



participate in some form of retail operations - with easily accessible banking services and innovative products most have stuck to corporate banking.

In general, their approach has been limited, tentative and lacking genuine competitiveness. In contrast, the big four Australian banks (three private and one government-owned) met the foreign invasion with a massive capital investment programme.

They poured money into electronic systems, a comprehensive automatic teller machine network, marketing programmes to develop new and acceptable financial prod-

Photo: Executive pressive considering that the group includes some of the biggest and most profitable names in world banking. But because many of them plunged quickly and recklessly into the lending scene to establish

greater than local banks. Japanese banks have performed well in Australia by restricting their operations to the blue-chip end of the corporate lending market and avoiding dealings with speculators and high-flying entrepreneurs. And forgot about

market shares. Foreign banks

acquired a percentage of non-

performing loans four times

the retail sector. US giant Chase Manhattan

Persevered with retail banking in Australia through five disastrous loss-making years before it called quits. It sold its retail operations to local operator Westpac last year, and now concentrates on profitable wholesale banking.

As an added incentive to attract newcomers, the government now allows foreign banks operating in a wholesale capacity to function as branches of parent banks. This gives them greater flexibility and reduces costs.

Retail banking by foreign banks will continue to be conducted within a framework incorporated locally as subsidiaries of the parents. This allows the Australian Reserve Bank to maintain supervision

and protection for depositors. The Reserve Bank rejects claims that Australia already has too many foreign banks. Reserve Bank governor Bernie Fraser recently stated: "Even in a crowded market, a place will always exist for new entrants who can provide some additional competition or some nice service." Foreign banks are expected to "make a worthwhile contribution to banking services in Australia, not only add to the number of banks," he said.

Hongkong Bank Australia (a subsidiary of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) hopes to make a profit this year, largely because it has distanced itself from entrepreneurial lending which characterised its commercial activities in previous years.

Leading the foreign bank pack in Australia, and showing how it should be done, is America's Bankers Trust. It is the most successful foreign bank operating in Australia.

BTA is wholly owned by the US parent. It has gained a reputation as a low profile but tough and aggressive operator, with a large reliance on prudent, old-fashioned banking caution in lending practice.

BTA has proved a substantial opponent for all banks in Australia. Prospective newcomers will no doubt study BTA's performance very carefully before opting to risk the dangerous Australian financial scene.

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