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ARMY MOVES INTO SINDH

Critics Ask for Political Action to Resolve Ethnic Conflicts

Some observers have likened the situation with that which existed in the former East Pakistan during the sixties. "Ayub Khan thought that Monem Khan had found the right prescription for the ailment eating the fahrir of the then Pakistan,'' wrote Khalid Akhtar in the Islamabad daily, The Muslim.

FOCUS ON PAKISTAN M J Zahedi writes from Karachi
THE federal government has ordered the Pakla tan Army to take over for six month* the maintenance of law and order In the troubled province of Sindh.
The action ha* been taken under Article 147 of the Constitution. In term* of which the government of Sindh requested the federal government for entrusting the function of public security and maintenance of law and order to the officers of the federal government for the stipulated period. The federal govern ment in Islamabad consented to the proposed arrangement and Issued necessary orders to the Commander, Fifth Corps, at Karachi. In this behalf
In plain words, for six month* from now the Commander of the Fifth Corps of the Pakistan Army will be the operational head of the province, although under a Joint operational plan which the federal Interior Minister had announced a few days earlier. the Corp* Commander, the Sindh Chief Minister and the Inspector-General of Police would form the operational committee that would run the province.
According to constitutional experts, since the Chief Minister has already surrendered the government's power* tn this field to the federal government, it is but logical that the Corp* Commander would be calling the shots, and the provincial authorities will have to go along.
It has not been as easy for the government to Initiate the action as It has been for the newsmen to report the developments. The action has come after several days of intense controversy and political discussion. Inside and outside the legislatures, In the party caucuses and the pages of the newspapers. In fact, It Is the only event of this nature which has followed such open official and unofficial debate — two days of exclusive discussion in the National Assembly, highlighting the remarkable change in style of government since the days of the late gen cral Zla-ul-Haquc. The government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif can surely take credit for this.
The government has shown political wisdom by not Invoking Section 245 of the
Constitution which suspend* operation of the civilian court* In similar circumstance*. Thal would have exposed It to severe criticism about curtailing the citizens' constitutional rights when Pakistan s Image in this respect Is already much tarnished, thanks mainly to abuse* tn Sindh. The government, however, reserves the right to do so if the need arises. The 1j«w Minister gave •uch a hint in the National Assembly on Wednesday night As noted earlier, the action was not unexpected. It was be Ing talked about for a long time as instances of lawlessness showed no sign of receding. The turmoil in the province is not new. It has been viblence ridden since the mid-eighties. It came in the form of ethnic riots, involving first Mohajlr* and Ihjkhtoons, then Mohajlr* and Punjabi* and finally. Mohajlr* and Slndhi*. There was also a brief but bloody tangle between Mohajlr* and Baluchis.
The breakdown of ethnic entente was followed by a rapid rise In the Incidence of car thefts, dacoitles and kld-nappings-for-ranaom. Even the constitutional amendment set ting up special courts for the speedy trial of killers, dacotts, kidnappers and terrorists did not help in arresting the upward trend as public floggings and the threat of public hanging during Zla-ul-Haque's time did nothing to reduce violent crimes.
It is Interesting to note that the nature of the turmoil has changed with the change of government in the province. During Z1a-ul-Haque's days when Mohammad Khan Junejo was the Prime Minister, ethnic riots were the order of the day. During the rule of the People's Party. Mohajir-Slndhi ethnic
strife had replaced all other*
A brief period of calm had followed the dismissal of the PPP government. When the calm was broken, the incidence of kidnapping increased alarmingly. School children and foreigner* (Chinese engineers working on aid projects and Japanese student-eum-tourists) were the victims. That introduced an ominous element In the situation: state authority had virtually ceased to exist and the dacolts and kidnappers had virtually come
people and generally abusing the womenfolk through their own organised gangs of dacotts or toughs.The most pathetic spectacle of the collapse of state power waa the kidnap ping and torture of a serving army officer at the hands of a powerful urban ethnic organl sation and the complete lack of punitive response from either the provincial or the federal government.
Secondly, since the days when Jam Sadiq Alt became the Chief Minister of the
to hold the government and people of Sindh to ransom. The government seemed paralysed until the latest kid napping of the personal repre •entatlve of tne Aga Khan seems to have finally aroused it Into action.
What Is most significant tn the Sindh situation Is a clear perception of the loss of legitimacy of the state and government. All provincial government* tn Sindh have been r Topped up and controlled rom Islamabad, even during the PPP day*, although the phenomenon was at its peak during the dictatorship of Zia-ul-llaque. That is why they havot never commanded much respect among the intelligentsia or the people of the province.
The situation induced various elements to owe allegiance to various centre* of power and take the law In their own hands. In the urban areas, the political parties exercised thetr own spheres of power. In the rural areas, the "waderas" or their "pathedars" ruled the roost, killing or kidnapping
province, the government has not been perceived as a neutral Institution, allowing the various political parties and group* to play their part Even the Eresent government is seen illowlng, though not as bia-tanth, his policies.
Observers do not think that the army action will yield the desired result. Even If the da coits are wiped out. new gangs many emerge. This will be mainly because the decisionmakers in the corridor* of power are not addressing themselves to eradicating the political and socio-economic conditions which foster the dacott culture. In fact, many observer* feel that the army operation is likely to further aggravate the political alien atlon among the Slndhi* and enlarge the base for the enrolment of dacolts and terror ists.
This is not to say that a strong action against dacolts and terrorists is not called for. Almost all political leaders have said that such an action has become essential. But, as the Ixader of the Opposition,
Ma Benazir Bhutto, has said, such an action must come as an Integral part of a political action plan.
Unfortunately no such plan exists; on the other hand, the twisted policy of using state organs to back various extremist groups to implicate rival parties or groups continues unabated. As one commentator has Mid, It Is a measure of the peace-mindedness of ruling forces that they have chosen to embrace extremist elements among Slndhls and Mohajlr*. even at the risk of breaking up the country, merely tn order to keep a party out of power '
The tragedy 1* that the armed force* are not perceived by Slndhls to be neutral and Impartial. The civil-military bureaucracy and Its members have big economic an financial stakes tn Sindh, which 1s visible to every Slndhi.The best agricultural lands have been allotted to military and civil personnel, almost all of whom are non-Sindhla. Most public sector industrial enterprises arc manned by non Slndhi officers and workers. The experience of 1983 when the pro-democracy movement was brutally suppressed In Sindh cannot be easily erased from the memory of the people. The recent incidence of rigging elections through violence, intimidation and gang rape of women tn the rural constituencies arc similar experiences which arc better forgotten but cannot be. The most recent episode of an "encounter" on the high seas near Karachi In which the Naval force* killed 13 men alleged to be member* of Al Zulfiqar, said to be a terrorist organisation led by the late Mr Bhutto's son Murtaza. The official account of the encounter
and the killings has not been accepted by any section of the publie.
Some observers have Hkcncd the situation with thai which existed in the former East Pakistan during the six-tie*. "Ayub Khan thought that Monem Khan had found the right prescription for the ailment eating the fabric of the then Pakistan." wrote Khalid Akhtar In the Islamabad dally. The Muslim. "Lacking political vision. Yahya Khan resorted to the only remedy he knew — the dreaded and destructive military option." Mr Akhtar continued and said. East Pakistan required a political remedy, but 1t was given a law and order do*c Now. 21 years later Islamabad is again n*sk-tng a wrong diagnosis, admin Istcring a wrong medicine in handling a familiar *ttuatfon.
According to him. the tong dictatorial rule of Ayub and Yahya had alienated the Slndhi* also The emergence of Bhutto had brought them In the mainstream. But his execution. "which will go down In history as the greatest political blunder", reverse the healing process in the Slndhi masses.
Since then, the Establishment In Islamabad has committed one folly after the other '
The writer thinks that by far the biggest folly waa the building up of the MQM as a mainstay against the PPP The PPP’s wings were clipped but at what cost to national unity? asks the writer. He then discusses the role of Jam Sadiq AH who he calls "the great executioner who played the destroyer role far more efficiently and ruthlessly than Monem Khan had done In East Pakistan In the six tie*." Jam Sadiq excessively used the state apparatus a^dnst his opponents. but It took him nowhere.
Politicians and commentator* have suggested various measure* to tackle the com-E“:atcd problem* of Sindh.
at of these are however ahort-term measures which will merely brush the problems under the carpet but not eliminate them. But If Islam abad remains obsessed with the Illusion of seeking a solution of the situation by eHmi-nating the PPP and by playing one group against the other, the results could be worse than experienced so far.