& çâÌæÚUæð´ ·¤è ¥ôÚU Îð¹Ùæ ÁæÚUè ÚU¹ð´ ¥ÍæüÌ ¥ÂÙð ÜÿØ ÂÚU ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´Ð ãæÚU Ù ×æÙð´, €UØô´ç·¤ ·¤æ× ·¤ÚUÙð âð ¥æÂ·¤ô ©gðàØ ·¤è Âýæç# ãôÌè ãñ ¥õÚU ÁèßÙ ·¤æ ¹æÜèÂÙ ÎêÚU ãôÌæ ãñÐ ÖÜð ãè ÁèßÙ ×ð´ ç·¤ÌÙè Öè ·¤çÆÙæ§ü €UØô´ Ù ¥æ°, çÁ™ææâæ ¥õÚU ©ˆâæã ÕÙæ° ÚU¹ð´Ð ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´, ÜÿØ ã×ðàææ ¥æÂ·Ô¤ Âæâ ãôÌð ãñ´ çÁ‹ãð´ ÂæÙð ·Ô¤ çÜ° ÂýØæâ ¥æÂ ·¤Öè Öè àæéM¤ ·¤ÚU â·¤Ìð ãñ´Ð

EC summit: Who gained what
MAASTRICHT! Netherlands), Dec 12: All 12 European Community leaders put their names to the Maastricht agreement and all 12 declared themselves happy, reports Reuter.
Here is what each of them achieved and what they did not
Helmut Kohl (Germany) — Secured a decisive step forward on EC integration, binding Germany more tightly to the Community through political and monetary union Tough economic criteria for joining the future single currency which, like the future European central bank, will be modelled on Germany's inflation-fighting principles: Greater powers for the European parliament.
Also strengthened cooperation on immigration, asylum and international crlme-fight-Ing through the new European force.
He didn't get as much as he wanted for the European parliament and had to settle for Judicial and police matters being handled by inter-governmental cooperation rather than through the Community's mechanisms.
John Major (Britain) — Obtained his opt-out clause (or opt-In clause, as he calls it) for the final stage of monetaiy union: Removed the word 'federal' from the treaty, ensured that foreign policy and police matters are handled in
separate inter-governmental 'pillars' and not under EC rules.
He prevented the EC as a whole gaining new powers on labour; Won new powers for the European parliament to control the European Commission and for the
European Court of Justice to fine states which don't respect its Judgements.
He failed to avoid isolation on the opt-out clause for monetary union and over social policy. And he had to accept a limited amount of majority voting on foreign policy.
Francois Mitterrand (France) —Secured the monetary union deal France has long coveted, including a commitment to a 1999 deadline for a single currency, helped conceive the embryo of a future European defence independent of the US, another longstanding, French goal.
He did not get an interventionist article on EC industrial policy or extensive majority voting on foreign policy.
Felipe Gonsales (Spain)— Obtained the binding commitments he sought for greater transfers of EC funds to poorer countries.
Giulio Andreotti (Italy) — Won the first commitment to monetary union with a strict timetable he had been working for since the two Rome sum mlts of a year ago.
The price he had to pay jva^accegUn^someJou^lyie^
formance targets for Italy's defleit-ridden economy if it is to join the future single currency. albeit with some flexibility
Wilfried Martens (Belgium) — Gave the European defence debate a push towards a greater EC role, and blocked any decision on the seat of the European central bank when it looked as though the price might be to confirm Strasbourg as the home of the European parliament at the expense of Brussels.
Jacques Santer (Luxembourg) — Saw the draft political uniori treaty his gov-, ernment painstakingly negotiated as EC president in the first half of 1991 emerge as the clear basis for the Maastricht deal.
Poul Schlueter (Denmark) — Obtained a protocol allowing Denmark to hold a referendum before the final stage of a single currency and another allowing it to continue to ban foreigners, particularly Germans. from buying holiday homes in Denmark.
Charles Haughey (Ireland) — Secured protection of Irish neutrality even as the EC adopts a defence role. Will benefit from the extra funds for poorer countries; and obtained a protocol allowing Ireland to retain its ban on