QUESTION : The treaty contains more than 800 pages of cloaely printed text. The political significance of thia document is known But what about ita purely military ’^ANSWER : It to difficult to divorce the military aapect of the treaty from Ita political significance. It reducea the level of nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the US. strengthen! atrateglc stability and thereby reduces the prob ability of a nuclear conflict. The important thing is that the treaty embraces all component! of strategic offensive weapons — land-based intercontinental ballistics missiles (ICBMs). submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and strategic aviation, including its air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and other nuclear armaments. It is a treaty which for the first time in history not only limits but also reduces strategic nuclear weapons.

The overall number of deployed ICBMs. SLBMs and heavy bombers Is being reduced to 1.600 and the number of warheads to 6.000, according to the official data which we have exchanged. The USSR currently possesses 2.500 nuclear delivery vehicles with 10.271 nuclear warheads assigned to them. The US has 2.222 delivery vehicles and 10.371 warheads.

We are reducing the overall number of delivery vehicles by 900 units or 36 per cent, of which 154 units will be heavy ICBMs which we alone possess and which wt arc cutting by half. The US will reduce the number of delivery vehicles by 622 units or by 28 per cent. Under the coordinated counting rules, the overall number of warheads on both sides will be reduced by 4.271 (USSR) and 4.371 (USA), or by 42 per cent on each side.

The concrete number of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to be reduced or taken off operational duty will depend on the structure and the conlposition of strategic

nuclear forces which the sides will deem necessary for them to have by the end of the reductions within the framework of the coordinated levels Tentatively, the USSR intends to reduce the number of Its ICBMs by approximately 400 missiles (30 per cent) and of SLBMs by 500 missiles (50 per cent): there will be practically no reductions In the number of Soviet heavy bombers (HB).

After the reduction the total throw weight of the deployed ICBMs and SLBMs will not ex ceed on each of the sides the level which is equivalent to approximately 50 per cent of the present total throw weight of all Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs.

The heavy ICBMs of the existing types which are due for numerical reduction can be modernized within the agreed upon criteria, whereas the development. manufacture and deployment of new types of heavy missiles Is prohibited .

Each heavy bomber carrying nuclear weapons will be counted as one missile delivery vehicle and included in the allowable limit of 1.600 units. One warhead will be registered with each of the bomber aircraft which arc supplied with

nuclear bombs and "alr-to-aur-face" missiles with a range of up to 600 kilometres and included tn the allowable limit of 6.000 unite. Ten warheads will be registered with each of the US heavy bombers that are fit to carry long-range (more than 600 kilometres) nuclear air-launched cruise missiles and eight with similar Soviet bombers.

Sea-Based cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometres are not subject for reduction under the START. They are limited in accordance with the binding political statements of the sides concerning the deployed long-range nuclear SBCMs. Throughout the operation of this treaty each side may not have more than 880 such missiles.

The reduction of ICBMs. SLBMs. heavy bombers and their armaments will be carried out over a period of seven years in three stages (the first stage will last three years and the second and the third stage — two years each). In accordance with the procedures which have been coordinated, the long-range nuclear weapons subject to reduction will be either re-equipped or scrapped. It is allowed to use ICBMs and SLBMs for launching objects into the upper layers of the atmosphere or outer space.

This treaty has been signed for 15 years. It can be extended every five years thereafter if it is not replaced with a new treaty before its original expiration date.

QUESTION : How do the US and we stand to gain by this treaty ?

ANSWER : Our partners consented to honour the 1972

ABM treaty. This is important because deep cute of strategic offensive weapons are impossible without a ban on the development and deployment of a new large-scale ABM system.

Second, we have managed to limit the range of air-launched cruise missiles to 600 kilometres. Why 600 kilometres ? There are several reasons. The most Important is the possibilities of our ABM system. If these missiles were allowed a longer range, the US could then deploy them on its tactical aviation aircraft and thereby hit our targets without actually entering the zone of our anti-missile defense.

Of great importance are the restrictions on sea-based cruise missiles (the range — upto 2.600 kilometre and the height of their flight — 50 metres). Combating such missiles Is a very complex task. SBCMs pose a serious threat. The US has a big advantage in such missiles.

We have come to agreement that the SBCM problem will be settled beyond the START treaty. The accord reached sets the celling of 880 SBCMs for each side and restricts their range to 600 kilometres

It goes without saying that tt was very difficult to come to agreement on this problem. Both sides had to make certain concessions. The Americans first insisted on a complete ban on the manufacture and any launches and modernization of our heavy ICBMs. But then we would be deprived of any possibility to match in any way a large-scale ABM system in the event the US deployed

As you know, we have agreed to halve our heavy ICBMs. not to create, test and

deploy new types of such missiles. but we have a right to modernise them.

Our mobile ICBMs shall be preserved. At the same time we have agreed to reduce about 50 per cent of the aggregate throw weight of our ICBMs and SLBMs. and to count every heavy bomber with low-yield nuclear weapons and nuclear bombs as one delivery vehicle and one warhead.

There are also other conditions. I want to stress the main thing: The START is a suffl clentiy balanced document that guarantees equality and equal security for the sides

QUESTION: Why have the sides agreed to a 40 per cent reduction when the Initial alm was to halve their strategic offensive armaments?

ANSWER: The thing is that the preliminary agreement on the number of remaining nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles was reached tn 1987. It was assumed that by 1991 there will be more delivery vehicles than we actually have now. But life has Introduced its own changes, and this is not surprising. I think that the 40 per cent reduction of nuclear weapons is a great achievement for both countries.

QUESTION: Who can guar antee that the treaty will be imp Iemented?

ANSWER: The guarantees are in the experience we have accumulated while Implementing the INF treaty, the strict verification procedures which include the use of national technical means, on-site in-' spections. exchange of data and notifications. as well as the lifting of limitations on access to information broadcast from ICBMs and SLBMs during their

take-off.

Verification procedures also provide for the presence of inspection groups at the facilities that produce mobile missiles and their trips to the deployment areas, as well as some other conditions compliance with which will maintain our trust in each other

QUESTION: The START has been signed, what next?

ANSWER: I think that the next stage of guaranteeing international security might be a qualitatively new stage in the cooperation of the Soviet Union, the USA and other countries. To begin with, we should activate political structures. 1 would single out two main directions: European-American and global. We have the best results tn the former. We could continue by setting the goal of going over from tn dividual major agreements to the creation of an effective system of mutual security, or standing structures of European security

I mean, we could create a standing body (a kind of European Security Council) that would have broad functions. probably on the basis of the conflict prevention centre, which would assimilate the existing military structures. In the course of this process we could continue reducing strategic nuclear weapons, agree on the further reduction of conventional forces (Vienna 2) and tactical nuclear weapons. We should also include naval forces into the negotiating process.

The second direction la the solution of major. global prob lems. above all concerning relations with developing countries. Its essence could be the maintenance of stability, prevention and settlement of regional conflicts, hindering the proliferation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons. missiles and missile technologies, and the reduction of trade In military hardware and armaments.