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NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA

Middle East May be the Key to US Worries

by Sabir Mustafa
***The real theatre of operation for Pakistan's nuclear forces may well lie further to the west, in the Middle East to be precise, which is why it worries the US as much as it does.
THE Issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia was recently forced back on the frontburner of debate by Washington's decision to suspend economic and military aid both to India and Pakistan, followed by Islamabad's proposal for an international conference to discuss the possibility of a nuclear-free zone tn the region.
The proposal received an early, possibly fatal setback when India dismissed it as nothing more than "a propaganda ploy'; India's rejection was also a demonstration of New Delhi's unwillingness to accept any extra-regional Intervention in mailers of regional or bilateral concern.
Meanwhile the United States kept up the pressure by warning China not to sell any ballistic missiles to Pakistan. Beijing said the missiles to be sold were only a few and would have less than 200km In range, but the Americans are clearly worried. Washington Is well aware that Pakistan is trailing India badly in missile development, and is desperate for technology to develop reliable delivery systems for Its nuclear warheads.
Despite US efforts to look even-handed In its handling of the nuclear issue in South Asia, it is quite evident now that Washington is far more concerned about, and determined to prevent, the nuclearisation of Pakistan's military than any move on India's part to acquire an atomic arsenal. While this may look unfair, the American position is dictated by a much wider concern than a simple desire to prevent a Third World country from going nuclear.
Pakistan says Its nuclear programme Is designed merely
to counter-balance the threat posed by India's nuclear capability. But this Une of rationale may not be as flawless as its proponents would have us believe.
For one thing, there is ample reason to believe that India's nuclear programme, together with its missile dellv-ety systems. Is not being developed with Pakistan In mind at all (India Is quite capable of taking care of Pakistan through conventional means). For another. the whole idea of nuclear weapons enhancing security Is not as straight-forward as It may seem on paper.
The point Is. if faced with defeat on the battle-field, would Pakistan seriously entertain the Idea of launching a nuclear strike on India, knowing
that the Inevitable retaliation would leave Pakistan totally annihilated? More important under the circumstances, would India regard a Pakistani nuclear threat as a credible one? If It didn't, then the whole logic behind Pakistan's nuclear policy would collapse Instantly, because nuclear arms are a viable defence option only so long as the intended 'target' viewed their presence as a genuine threat to his existence. And If Pakistan were to take the plunge and launch, then that would again signal the failure of deterrence, with devastating consequences. With Its credibility as a deterrent tn serious doubt. Pakistan's nuclear option vis-a-vis security against India seems almost a non-starter.
But a high-risk programme involving billions of dollars
would not have been undertaken without a clear-cut strategy and goal that made sense to its formulators. The real theatre of operation for Pakistan's nuclear forces may well lie further to the west, in the Middle East to be precise, which Is why it worries the US as much as it does. It has long been suspected that the Pakistani nuclear project is financed entirely by Arab states, hence its nickname The Islamic Bomb.
At present Israel is In the unique position of having both a nuclear monopoly and a decisive edge In conventional capability over its regional rivals. Tel Aviv’s acquisition of nuclear weapons Is primarily an
insurance against the longterm possibility of losing its conventional superiority. But unless Arab states can counter this new, strategic threat, they would neither be able to deter Israel from further aggression nor force it to accept the principle of exchanging land for peace. For Its part, Israel has already demonstrated Its Intention and capability to prevent any Arab state from acquiring nuclear weapons.
That Is where Pakistan comes in. and that is why it worries the Americans as much. Pakistan is beyond the reach of the Israeli air force (one assumes, but of course, one can never tell with the Israelis!), and out of regional arms control considerations. Once Pakistan procures a missile system capable of delivering nuclear warheads on
Israeli cities. Islamabad will be. theoretically, in a position to provide a nuclear umbrella for Arab states confronting Israel.
For the United States, which sees the survival and security of Israel as one of two non-variable factors In its Middle East policy (control of oil being the other), the current balance of power in the region is an ideal one, since it would prevent Arabs from entertaining any thought about dealing with Israel militarily, while leaving the US the option of pressuring Israel into making concessions on the issues of territory.
At the same time. Washington is keen to stabilise
the arms build-up In West Asia and begin a winding-down process from Its current position. First step has been the destruction of Iraqi capability to threaten Israel. Next step would be to ban all states in the region from acquiring nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) weapons as well as missile delivery systems. Characteristically, the US has not called on Israel to destroy Its stockpile of NBC weapons, even though the only Arab state with such a capability. Iraq, has already been forced -to disarm.
This fits in nicely with US desire of keeping Israel dominant in the region. But Pakistan's entry into West Asia's nuclear equation would seriously upset this aspect of US policy. The other aspect of Washington's policy — gradual
disarmament — would also be put in Jeopardy as Tel Aviv would be most unlikely to be part of a general Middle East arms control regime, since that would leave a de-nucle-arised Israel facing the possibility of Arab states being extended nuclear cover by Pakistan.
Thus a Pakistan armed with nuclear-Upped missiles can. in theory, pose a serious threat to Israel, Jeopardise an overall disarmament process In the region, and destabilise the security balance in the Indian subcontinent Itself by triggering a self-defeaUng arms race.
India, on the other hand, does not have its eyes on the Middle East at all, and thus does not worry the US to tire same degree. Washington may
even view India's nuclear programme as an acceptable one. as New Delhi has to find ways of countering the massive nuclear and conventional threat posed by China with whom it fought a bloody, losing war in 1962. Even as late as 1971, India had to call on Soviet support to deter the Chinese from intervening on behalf of Pakistan. New Delhi knows only too well it cannot go on relying on such ready support, and has consequently moved steadily to build-up its own deterrence against China.
With the collapse of Soviet power and decision by the US to scale-down Its permanent presence in Asia. India is being seen by many as the logical counter-balance to China's growing power in the region.
For the United States, India is politically more digestible
than China. Although New Delhi has maintained a staunchly non-aligned foreign policy since independence and has often clashed with US in terests particularly in I he Third World; its democrats institutions and free markei economic orientation are like K to make India gravitate to wards the West.
For its part, the West has already withdrawn from tl)<-South Asian scene and allowed India to act quite indepen dently. as was evident from tlx-amount of elbow-room New Delhi was given In Sri Lanka in 1987 and the Maldives tn 1988. India is clearly shaping up as a major power in South and South-East Asia, taking in a wide expanse of the Indian Ocean from the Straits of Malacca to the east to the Strait of Hormuz to the west. Maintenance of a strong nuclear force and a blue water navy are necessary for India both to deter the Chinese in the north and project Its power across the ocean.
The Americans, who are no strangers to the power game, are under no illusions about the logic behind India's nu clear drive. In the long-run. Washington probably sees a highly Independent but demo cratic India as a more reliable ally than the ideologically suspect communist China. The US has always refrained from applying any pressure on India on such sensitive internal matters as Kashmir or Punjab, or on regional disputes such as the one with Nepal in 1989 These are Indicative of America's willingness to treat India as a regional power Tills policy of accommodation may have already expanded to accept India's emergence as a nuclear power as well.