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Despite Peace Breakdown Angola will Go Multi-party

by Keith Somerville
***Once again high hopes of peace in Angola have been dashed. Following superpower agreement on bringing the warring parties together talks were convened in Lisbon with Portugal, the Soviet Union and the United States taking part When the talks broke down a few days later each side had a different version of the reasons. A major snag was an unexpected Angolan demand that a ceasefire be proclaimed on the same day as the introduction of a multi-party system.
THE latest round of the Angolan peace talks broke up in Lisbon amid much mutual recrimination and evident re-Rrcl. The meeting had convened two days early with hopes of at least an agreement on the modalities of a ceasefire and the introduction of a multi-party democracy. In the end nothing was signed.
After the break-up. al) the players—the Angolan MPLA government. Jonas Savimbis UNITA movement and a coalition of Portugal, the United Slates and the Soviet Union-put forward their versions of what had happened.
The Angolan chief representative. former prime minister Lopo de Nascimento, said that unlike his government. UNITA was not serious about the talks. Despite lack of agreement, his ruling MPLA Workers' Party would go ahead in April with the plan agreed at its December 1990 Congress to introduce a multiparty system in place of the present one-party regime.
UNITA and the convenors of the talks each blamed the MPLA government in Luanda for the breakdown. They said UNITA had been willing to sign a document drawn up by Portugal. the US and the Soviet Union on the introduction of a multiplicity of parties, arrangements for elections and the details of a ceasefire.
But the government delegation led by de Nascimento had demanded that agreement on a date for the introduction of a multi-party system—April 15—be accompanied by a firm accord making that also the ceasefire date. The three states backing the agreement said that this introduced a new element into the talks and prevented a settlement.
Before the meeting, both the Luanda delegation and UNITA had indicated general acceptance of the five-point plan.
In late January, the Angolan government had said it agreed with the plan, which set out to achieve multi-party democ-racy. an internationally agreed ceasefire, free and fair elections. a ceasefire accord preceded by an accord on the dale for elections and an end to al) foreign military help to the two sides.
Then, in the run-up to the talks, both the MPLA and UNITA seemed to add new clauses. Luanda, which above al) else wants an end to the fighting, decided it must have a definite ceasefire date.
UNITA on the other hand, which wants recognition as a legitimate political movement and a date for elections within a year of April 15. decided that a ceasefire could wait. The leader of the UNITA delegation. Jeremias Chitunda. VicePresident to Savtmbi. said on arrival in Lisbon on February 4 that a ceasefire might have to wait until ail Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola. This date had already been set by the quadripartite agreement which led to neighbouring Namibia's Independence. All Cubans arc expected to leave by June. No ceasefire until June would mean continuation of the war.
Sudden UNITA concern about the Cubans is strange as the departure date for the withdrawal has been known for over a year and there is no sign that the Cubans are dragging their feet.
The UNITA statement can only be seen as a tactic to pul greater pressure on the MPLA to agree to dates for the Introduction of a constitutionally guaranteed multi-party system and for national elections.
What seems to have emerged once more from yet another fruitless round of talks is that the gulf between UNITA and the MPLA in terms of trust and ability to cooperate is as great as ever.
The government does not want an election date or the constitutional changes set in stone before it has an internationally agreed ceasefire, though It Is willing to sign agreements on all three simultaneously.
It has the most to foae. It wants the war stopped; It will not give UNITA what it wants in terms of legalisation before it gets an end to the fighting.
UNITA, on the other hand, wants public recognition of Its role in Angola's political future and an enforceable, internationally backed agreement on elections before it gives up its chief weapon, continuation of the war.
In the middle are the three countries trying to arrange a deal—Portugal.the US and the Soviet Union. All want a ceasefire and the start of a peaceful political process, although there are divisions over what final outcome they want.
The US wants to give UNITA as much of a chance to oust the MPLA as possible. At one stage it was being said by sources close to the CIA in Washington that the US wanted to sec the MPLA defeated before the Cubans withdrew—thus humiliating them tn the way that the Americans were humiliated in Saigon.
This position would dovetail with the UNITA position that a ceasefire should await a Cuban withdrawal. Even if the MPIA is not militarily defeated, a Cuban withdrawal before the end of the war would be some “** of a propaganda victory for the Americans and UNITA. They could say Cuba s M«ton had failed.
Moscow wants an end to the war, an end to Its costly military commitment to the MPLA and a settlement that gives the MPLA some influence and access to government. They do not want to be seen tn Africa as pulling tj>e nig out from under the MPLA* feet. Nevertheless, they are pushing , Luanda as hard as possible far • peace agreement and ceaac-
Portugal Just seems to want an end to the war and a chance to enter Into a more regular political and. most Importantly economic relationship with Its former colony. Il has much to gain from gettii^ In on the ground floor of any post-war economic reconstruction . I
Angola is one of the richest countries tn Africa in terms of mineral resources and agricultural potential. Portugal lias long experience of development and exploitation in Angola and wants the chance to help Angola towards a peace that will be mutually beneficial.
Whatever the individual aims of the three mediators, they are unlikely to have much success until the two warring movements can lower their psychological guards long enough to sign the necessary accords. So far. experience has shown this is unlikely In the foreseeable future unless heavy pressure can be put on them.
It ts hard to see what forms of pressure would work. A halt to arms supplies would lake a time to work, given the hu^e arsenals on both sides, and In any event the war would continue for months If not years at a tower technological level.
The next meeting has been set for March 4. FAv expA-i a sudden change of heart by either the MPLA or UNITA, so pessimism is the order of the day — GEMINI NEWS
KEITH SOMERVILLE is a writer and broadcaster on African affairs. He is the author of Angola; Politics. Economics and Society and to a regular contributor to South. New African and Africa Contemporary Research