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Nuclear disarmament in the Middle East

KAZI ANWARUL MASUD
EXIT of a bedraggled Saddam Hussein captured from a rat hole heralding his final exit from the global scene appears to have encouraged selective nuclear non-proliferation. On 19th December 24, 2003 President Bush revealed that after nine months of "quiet diplomacy" with Anglo-US officials Libyan leader Qaddafi has publicly confirmed his commitment to disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass destruction programmes; to allow immediate and unconditional international inspections on all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes and help oversee their elimination. President Bush reiterated that "opposing proliferation is one of the highest priorities of the war against terror" as terrorists, if they ever gain WMD, would kill hundreds of thousands of innocent people "without hesitation and without mercy." He assured that the US would continue its vigilance against proliferation through enhanced intelligence capabilities; interdiction of materials and technologies in transit; insistence on multi-lateral approach as in the case of North Korea; and support IAEA "to hold Iran to its treaty obligations". Only a day earlier Iran signed additional nuclear inspection agreements described by the Arms Control Association (ACA) as "a significant step towards ensuring that Iran lives up to its commitment under NPT to forswear nuclear weapons."
ACA believes that Iran is now closer to weapon-making capability than previously thought and that Iran has been pursuing for many years nuclear activities in violation of the NPT obligations. However, to make Iran turn away permanently from the pursuit of nuclear programme will need joint US-EU-Russian strategy. An important element of such a strategy has to be US and Israeli guarantee not to attack Iranian nuclear facilities thus reducing Iranian incentive to acquire nuclear weapons to defend itself and at the same time to increase benefits to Iran for openness and compliance.
Another element has to be unambiguous US position of not acquiescing with the undeclared status of other nuclearised countries particularly that of Israel. One should, however, not forget that on several occasions in 1999 then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told President Clinton that Israel would never sign Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMTC) because it would be suicidal. This "nuclear ambiguity" according to McGeorge Bundy (of Kennedy era) and William Crow Jr (former Head of CIA) is a significant impediment to arms control and nonproliferation because no Israeli
government can make a convincing case that no state need to fear a nuclear Israel unless the Jewish state is threatened with extinction. If one were to mention the cases of India and Pakistan then acquisition of nuclear weapons by India is clearly to secure itself from mainly China (and now increasingly Pakistan) while Pakistan's acquisition is to balance her defense capabilities vis-à-vis India which has absolute superiority in conventional weapons over Pakistan. It is therefore not surprising that 2000 NPT Review Conference recognized that universality would depend on successful efforts to enhance regional security in tension filled areas like the Middle East and South Asia.
Though the neo-cons in the US would like people to believe that the Iranian and Libyan decision on nuclear disarmament was to avoid the fate of Iraqi "regime change", one should not find it difficult to believe Libyan Prime Minister's statement that the decision was made to divert resources from purchasing military hardware to developmental efforts in order to raise the standard of living of the people; further opening of Western markets consequent upon lifting of US sanctions against Libya; and return of the Americans to the Libyan oil fields. In case of Iran one may recall that the late Ayatollah Khomeini used to consider possession of nuclear weapons as immoral.
It is now recognized that the real danger to international security and stability is the possession of WMD by rogue states and terrorists. International vigilance, particularly by P-5 of the UNSC, is essential to guard against the possibility of nuclear weapons and/or technology falling into the hands of non-state actors. Rogue states have to be identified, isolated and pun-
ished for the slightest infraction of non-proliferation regime. It is now reported that Pakistani nuclear scientists including the father of Pakistani atom bomb may have passed crucial technology relating to uranium enrichment to Iran, North Korea and possibly other nations (NYT22.12.03). As a charter member of the NPT and a country with substantial leverage with Pakistan, the US bears substantial responsibility to bring pressure on Pakistan so that Pakistan does not assist non-nuclear states in acquiring nuclear technology. Problem, however, arises from US reluctance to take a hard line with Pakistan because of that country's "front line" status in the war on terror. It is feared that militant Islamists holding strong anti-US sentiments may get political mileage from discomfiture caused to Pakistani military ruler, should the US take him to task. On the other hand, soft paddling by the US may have grave danger because of (a) suspicious links between some elements of Pakistani military establishment with Al-Qaida and rogue states; (b) reported departure of two Pakistani nuclear scientists to reclusive Myanmar on the eve of they being questioned by the US authorities, their departure reportedly arranged/agreed upon by Pakistani authorities; (c) Pakistan's long history of political instability cannot rule out the possibility of a coup d'etat by Islamist elements who will then control the nuclear arsenal; and , (d) Pakistan's image as one of the most unstable nations in the world. In the case of Israel, in the long run it will be difficult to maintain its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East without courting potentially catastrophic consequences. Israel should pursue with US support stronger engagement in nuclear non-proliferation regime, an engagement which
should not be a hostage to finding a just, stable and enduring peace in the region.
Terrorist attacks on 9/11 on New York and Washington will be considered as iconic moments when the history of the twenty first century will be written. As the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union irrevocably changed the global power balance events of 9/11 removed the veil which had shrouded the "new unilateralism" which had effectively been enjoyed by the US for the last decades of the Twentieth century. American pre-eminence, its unrivalled power, its unchallenged domination, its global hegemony became apparent to all. As opposed to the Cold War days, Russian affairs expert Nicolai Zlobin explains, the definition of war itself has changed. Contemporary warfare is a mechanism for regime change or a mechanism for regulating the activities of a regime in a given country. The nature of the enemy has changed, its army has become shadowy, and its hierarchy unknown. In the event of defeat of the enemy there is no one to negotiate the terms of surrender with. In effect the world has to deal with the absence of statehood in potential enemies. This has complicated the global security system. That is why non-proliferation is so vitally important now in the war on terror. During the Cold War the USA and USSR ensured the security of the members of their respective camps and therefore there was no incentive for nuclear proliferation nor was it allowed by the camp leaders. But the end of the Cold War cut the knot binding the camp followers and set them adrift. Some of these countries in the absence of nuclear umbrella, started clandestine nuclear programmes to ensure their security. This ushered in the process of horizontal proliferation of
nuclear weapons . If the end of the Cold War induced some countries to embark on the nuclear path it also contributed to the emergence of failed states, a vitally important player in the war on terror. During the Cold War the two camps competed for influence by providing economic and military aid to weak and corrupt regimes in the name of ideological causes. The end of the Cold War meant deprivation of assistance which had hitherto propped up these regimes plunging them into the abyss of politico-economic disaster which their ineffective institutions, weak political culture, ethnic and religious fragmentation could not cope with.
It has already been stated the nuclear proliferation results from, which Robert Jarvis calls "security dilemma", the classic example being Indo-Pak arms race. The problem of proliferation faced by the international community, particularly the great powers, is that they look at the issue from the supply side ignoring the demand side of the equation. Indubitably the supply side has acquired greater weightage because of the emergence of non-state actors who can cause scarring economic, political and psychological devas-tation which in the past could only be inflicted upon by nation states. It has therefore become greatly important to control the supply of nuclear weapons and technology lest they fall into wrong hands. But ignoring the demand side of the equation, in the case of Middle East for example, would not eliminate the problem of proliferation. In this context Colonel Gaddafi's recent interview given to CNN becomes relevant. He reportedly said that his government's "corrective actions" in renouncing WMD would not only encourage North Korea, Iran and Syria (suspected of having nuclear programme) to abandon their destructive efforts but would also "tighten the noose around the Israelis, so that they would expose their programme of weapons of mass destruction."
Recent Iranian and Libyan actions prove that diplomacy works more effectively than preemptive military attacks as in the case of Iraq in which the justification for the attack changed from Al-Qaida connection to WMD elimination to liberation of Iraqis from the clutches of a dictator. In May this year, Senator Dianne Feinstein expressed her fear that by adopting a policy of unilateralism and preemption, by undermining international law and institutions, and by increasing US reliance on nuclear weapons Bush administration may actually be encouraging proliferation which the US wants to prevent. It would therefore be prudent for the Diarchic Consuls of the world to forswear the use of arms and not to be Quixotic by imagining windmills as giants, flocks of sheep as enemy soldiers, and country inns as castles to be defeated and destroyed. The developed and developing worlds are at one in defeating terrorism. Those who thought otherwise are seeing the futility of their course. It would, therefore, be advisable to bring Iran and Libya within the fold of a nomocratic global society while at the same time continue efforts to correct distortions which exist on the demand side of the equation on proliferation.