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Independent commission against corruption

How we would like it to be
AT the outset, let's welcome the draft bill to form an independent anti-graft commission which has received cabinet approval for an onward transmission to the parliament for consideration and eventual adoption. Admittedly though, it comes under process after a good deal of foot-dragging on the issue. We don't want to speculate about whether it is coming about under donor pressure or by virtue of a self-willed decision, although we would very much like to believe the latter held sway. Whatever may be the trigger point, needless to say, we take heart in the emerging prospect of an independent anti-corruption commission being in sight.
That said, we have three sets of comments to offer pertaining to the status, structure and functioning aspects of the proposed anti-graft commission. In the first place, what will be its locus standi? The consensual answer in a full-throated chorus to this vital question would be that inasmuch as the body needs to be statuswise independent giving it an in-built autonomous character, it ought to be a constitutional or statutory authority. The draft in its present form, gives the president the power to select the chairman and two members of the commission from amongst a panel of six prepared by a select committee comprising six members. Under the Constitution, the president is required to consult the prime minister before any appointent, except the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In other words, the head of the state would not be free to choose the chairman and members of the commission. There has to be a constitutional amendment empowering the president by way of a waiver on 'consulting' the prime minister in this particular case.
The whole point about constituting such a body is to keep all kinds of executive leverages at bay and this better be provided for at the formation stage itself. It is also in the fitness of things that this is done because all executive functionaries, including the head of the government ought to come under its purview. In the USA, India, and even in Thailand, heads of government have and do come under the scrutiny of independent investigation agencies. The bill in its present form, includes two ministers in the six-member selection committee. There have been allegations of corruption against ministers. So they better remain out of the committee. In fact, every single minister should come under the purview of the anti-graft commission's writ.
What is fundamentally missing from the draft bill is bipartisan representation in the selection committee. Without the Opposition's involvement in it, an essential and vital part of the consultative process is made a short shrift of. There must be an adequate slot for the opposition in the selection process. Furthermore, we have learnt the hard way that the line between the government and the ruling party is usually blurred with a partisan attitude getting the better of any administration's best judgement. This has happened in a cyclic order, regardless of which party came to power. A robust opposition presence in the process, duly reflected on the final selection of the chairman and members to the anti-graft body would introduce the much-needed political neutrality into the system.
We have found that the working of even statutory bodies is dependent on the will of the executive which keeps the purse and establishment-related strings to itself. The anti-graft commission shouldn't be an appendage of any ministry. Physically also, it should have an independent location. Not merely structurally, it has to be also functionally independent and selfcontained with delegated financial authority and the powers to investigate and grant sanction of trial. It should be able to select its own manpower and the careers of its different functionaries should be protected from the likely wrath of any quarters. Unless they are fearless in the performance of their duties, no matter how appropriately the commission is otherwise equipped, no good would come of it.
So, it's a good move, but a lot of questions remain unanswered. That's why there should be a full and fair debate in parliament on the question with the opposition inputs reflected on the final outcome.