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Does anybody understand the D/L Method? - I

In a three-part article serialised for THE DAILY STAR SPORT, the country's renowned cricket patron KZ ISLAM, traces the history of the Duckworth-Lewis Method used for calculating rain-affected matches. The author draws upon memorable instances where and how the D/L Method was applied and how sometimes it went wrong. Besides he gives his own views on what has become the universally accepted practice. We hope his thought-provoking essay, which appears from today, will give our readers a broader perspective of the D/L Method. We would also appreciate their feedback on it. -- Sports Editor
I think Bangladesh cricket team should understand the Duckworth-Lewis Method (D/L) very well since they were involved twice during the successful 1997 ICC Trophy competition in Malaysia in March-April.
The D/L Method as a whole was invoked nine times during the meet including the final where Bangladesh reached their target to beat Kenya off the very last ball of the thriller.
Incidentally, I had forgotten the precise scores of that match so I phoned the skipper Akram Khan to refresh my memory. He immediately said that the target was to score 166 runs in twenty-five overs. He was not sure about how many runs Kenya had scored. I looked up the tables and found a factor of 68.7 according to the D/L Method for the second innings of twenty-five overs. My calculated score came to 241.
By the time Akram phoned me I told him that Kenya had scored 241, which he confirmed as correct. While we are on the subject of the ICC Trophy of 1997 it must be acknowledged that had Akram not scored 67 not out to beat Holland in the quarterfinals we certainly would not have reached the final and eventually attained ODI and Test status.
The team that has been victimised most for rain-affected matches is South Africa. It all started in the 1992 World Cup semifinal. In that match played in Sydney England batted first and in a shortened innings of forty-five overs scored 252 for the loss of six wickets. In reply South Africa needed twenty-two runs from thirteen balls when rain came which reduced their innings by two overs. That left them to score twenty-two runs from one ball. This absurd situation was really the forerunner of the D/L Method.
I emailed Frank Duckworth asking him what method had been applied in that match. I must say Duckworth was
very prompt and within half an hour I received the following reply:
"It was the Australian 'most productive overs method' the target was either 22, or 21 (according to Wisden) in one ball. But it wasn't the absurdity of the target that was the problem (one can get this under any method if you are below 'par' at the stoppage even under D/L) what it was that at the stoppage South Africa were 'level par'; i.e. they had an evens chance of
making what was needed, but the MPO rain rule, which credited them with only 1 run for the two overs lost (as SA had bowled one maiden over an one which went for 1 run some reports say two maidens so the target remained at 22), converted this evens chance into a zero chance. D/L would have converted the target into needing 4 to win (3 to tie) off the one ball. But the real stupidity was in coming back for only 1 ball.
Surely if conditions were okay for one ball, then they were okay for 13?"
In the first round of the World Cup 2003 South Africa had a brush with Sri Lanka who had scored 268 for nine wickets in fifty overs. In the second innings South Africa were on 229 for six when rain stopped play. Frank Duckworth told The Australian that the Proteas only have themselves to blame after mistakenly believing they already had enough runs to claim a narrow victory over the Lankans and their place in the Super Sixes. But with the team batting second in a one-day international is always given a computer printout showing exactly how many runs are needed should rain intervene in a match, Duckworth says South Africa was culpable.
They messed it up, Duckworth said, "The printout says at the bottom that this is the score which would result in a tied match if the match is washed out."
Had Shaun Pollock not been run out the target after forty-five overs would have been 226. The rain had stopped after fifteen minutes and if South Africa had scored a single more run they would have won, but unfortunately the match was abandoned as it started raining again after fifteen minutes. Personally, I feel that there ought to be advisors from the organisers on hand to advise the team on the workings of the complicated D/L Method.
It may be mentioned that South Africa lost in an earlier first-round match of World Cup 2003 against New Zealand when the Proteas had scored a respectable 306 for six wickets in their innings. Rain had curtailed the Group B match to a total of 226 in thirty-nine overs which New Zealand reached with thirteen balls to spare and the loss of only one wicket. In both the matches the rain gods did not favour the Proteas as they were bowed out from the preliminary stage.
The D/L Method is a fair approach for resetting the target in interrupted
ing the total number of runs they can make within the constraints imposed by two limited resources. They have a maximum number of allocated overs, and they have ten wickets which they can lose, of generally decreasing value as they go down the order after the first four or so. The second team has to beat the first team's score within these same two constraints. The optimisation exercise in either team's task involves choosing some compromise between scoring fast and hence taking higher risks of losing wickets, and playing carefully and
one-day cricket matches. If there is a delay to start a match then the number of overs-per-team is simply reduced equally and equitably for both teams. But if there is an interruption after play has commenced there are problems.
To quote Duckworth and Lewis: "The difficulties arise because of the nature of the game. The first team batting are set the problem of optimis-
hence risking making insufficient runs. Whatever strategy a team adopt, they are always compromising between the constraints on their two resources, overs and wickets. But when an innings has to be shortened, only one of these resources, overs, is depleted and the balance is upset." --To be continued